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PUNITIVE DAMAGES, JURY DISCRETION AND THE
"OUTER LIMITS" OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN CIVIL CASES
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
Ill S. Ct. 1032 (1991)
Douglas T Miracle
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages have been an integral part of the American judicial landscape
since 1791 and were first recognized in Great Britain in 1763.1 Despite the long
history of punitive damages, however, the past decade has seen a substantial in-
crease in both their frequency and monetary value, giving rise to greater concern
among civil defendants. 2 Now, more than 200 years after the recognition of puni-
tive damages in the United States and after numerous constitutional challenges,
the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip3
("Pacific Mutual") has given punitive damages a qualified endorsement under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Despite the Supreme Court's affirmance of Alabama's
punitive damages scheme, however, the Court acknowledged the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment may still impose limitations upon the imposition of
punitive damages.' Unfortunately, the Court, did not articulate where those limi-
tations may be or under what standards those limitations should be analyzed.
This note will examine the Pacific Mutual decision by first considering the his-
tory of punitive damages. Next, this note will illustrate how both punitive and
compensatory damages evolved in Great Britain and the United States, focusing
upon the divisiveness which characterized the debate over the doctrine. This note
will then explore, in detail, the United States Supreme Court's analysis which was
utilized to uphold Alabama's method for imposing punitive damages.
This note will also attempt to demonstrate that the Court's analysis, which fo-
cused upon the post-jury review of punitive damages awards in Alabama, was
flawed due to the fact that the decision did not provide Pacific Mutual with due
process prior to the jury's imposition of punitive damages. Due to the Court's reli-
ance upon the post-jury review, this note will argue that the Pacific Mutual deci-
1. Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A Look at Origins and Legitimacy, 41 FED'N OF INS. & CORP.
COuNS. Q. 375,380 (1991) [hereinafter Sensibar] (citing Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)) (specifically
recognizing the first punitive damage award in the United States); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P.
1763) (specifically recognizing the first punitive damage award in Great Britain).
2. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
3. 111S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1046 (where the Court indicated that the award in the present case approached the "outer limits" of
what would be constitutionally permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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sion does not provide a civil defendant the requisite elements of procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this note will illustrate
the potential implications which the Court's decision may have upon the future of
punitive damages awards in the United States.
11. FACTS
Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr. was an insurance agent employed by Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance, an Alabama-based insurance company.6 Ruffin was also a licensed in-
surance agent for Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Union").'
The two insurance companies which employed Lemmie Ruffin were non-affili-
ated and distinct business entities. 8 Union wrote group health insurance policies
for municipalities9 while Pacific Mutual did not.1"
Cleopatra Haslip, Cynthia Craig, Alma M. Calhoun and Eddie Hargrove were
employed by Roosevelt City, an Alabama municipality. 11 Ruffin, in his capacity as
an insurance agent for Pacific Mutual, solicited the city for both life and health in-
surance policies.12 Ruffin made a single proposal to the city employees for both
types of insurance coverage. 3 The city of Roosevelt approved the insurance pro-
posal in August of 1981,14 and Ruffin prepared separate applications to reflect both
health and life insurance coverage.15 The group health plan was to be covered by
Union, while the life insurance policies were to be written by Pacific Mutual. 6
This type of insurance packaging arrangement was not unusual in the insurance
industry because it helped increase life insurance sales by reducing the loss of cus-
tomers who preferred to have both life and health insurance protection under one
policy. 17
The initial premium payments were submitted to the appropriate insurance
companies accompanied by the policy applications.1 Under the packaging agree-
ment, however, Union was required to send its insurance premium billings for the
health insurance to Ruffin at Pacific Mutual's office in Birmingham, Alabama.19
The checks for the health insurance premiums were sent directly to Ruffin at his
Birmingham office.2" However, instead of remitting the premium payments to Un-













19. Id. The premiums were to be obtained through payroll deductions of the insured employees. Id. The city




ion for the life insurance policies, Ruffin misappropriated most of the premiums."
By late 1981, after Union had not received the premium payments from Pacific
Mutual, it sent notices to the city employees that the coverage had lapsed, in care
of Patrick Lupia, Pacific Mutual's agent in charge of the Birmingham office.22
However, the lapsed coverage notices were never forwarded to the employees,
who therefore had no notice that their insurance coverage had been terminated.23
In January of 1982, Cleopatra Haslip, one of the insured city employees, was
hospitalized and subsequently incurred both hospital and physician's expenses.24
The hospital was unable to confirm Haslip's health insurance coverage upon her.
discharge from the hospital and thus required Haslip to make immediate payment
on the outstanding medical bill . 2' Haslip was unable to tender payment in satisfac-
tion of the bill and her account was referred to a collection agency for settlement.26
The collection agency obtained a judgment against Haslip for the unpaid balance
of her hospital account.27
In May of 1982, the city employees filed suit against both Pacific Mutual and
against Lemmie Ruffin, individually. 28 The employees alleged that "Ruffin col-
lected premiums but failed to remit them to the insurers so that [the employees']
respective health insurance policies lapsed without their knowledge."29 In addi-
tion, the employees claimed damages for fraud.3" The case was submitted to a
jury, and after the trial court's charge on the liability issue, the trial judge in-
structed the jury "that if it determined there was liability for fraud, it could award
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. "Although there is some evidence to the contrary, see Reply Brief for Petitioner B l-B4, the trial court






29. Id. at 1037.
30. Id. "The case ... was submitted to the jury under a theory of respondeat superior. "Id. The theory of re-
spondeat superior is a legal principle which enables a plaintiff to recover damages from an employer due to an
injury which is inflicted by an employee. The employer can be held liable for the injuries which are inflicted by
his employees in the course and scope of the employer's business. Id. at 1041.
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punitive damages. "31 The jury returned general verdicts for the employees against
Pacific Mutual and against Lemmie Ruffin both in his individual capacity and as
an agent for Pacific Mutual.32 Cleopatra Haslip received the largest verdict of the
four employees which totalled $1,040,000 . Each of the other three plaintiffs
awards was significantly less than Haslip's, totalling approximately $38,000.
Pacific Mutual appealed the judgment, and by a divided vote, the Alabama Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. 5 The Alabama Supreme Court
determined that while punitive damages were not recoverable under Alabama law
for misrepresentation by mistake, punitive damages were recoverable for willful
fraud or deceit. 6 The Alabama Supreme Court specifically upheld the jury's puni-
tive damage award against Pacific Mutual.37 Two justices dissented, asserting that
31. Id. at 1037. The jury was instructed as follows:
"Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages you may in your
discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you don't even have to find fraud, you wouldn't have to,
but you may, the law says that you may award an amount of money known as punitive damages."
"This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but is not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It
is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which means
to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that
the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has a fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct
result they were injured and in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award puni-
tive damages."
"Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money recovery to the plain-
tiffs, . . . by way of punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the public by
detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive dam-
ages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means that you don't have to award it unless this jury feels
that you should do so."
"Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the char-
acter and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and the necessity of preventing similar
wrong."
Id. at 1037 n. I (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 1037. "Pacific Mutual made no objections on the ground of lack of specificity in the instructions and
it did not propose a more particularized charge. No evidence was introduced as to Pacific Mutual's financial
worth." Id.
33. Id. However, the Court stated that:
Although there is controversy about the matter, it is probable that the general verdict for respondent
Haslip contained a punitive damages component of not less than $840,000. In Haslip's counsel's argu-
ment to the jury, compensatory damages of $200,000 (including out-of-pocket expenditures of less than
$4,000) and punitive damages of $3,000,000 were requested. Tr. 810-814.
Id. at 1037 n.2.
34. Id. at 1037. The breakdown for each of the other three plaintiffs was as follows: Calhoun: $15,290;
Craig: $12,400; and Hargrove: $10,288. Id.
35. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989).
36. Id. at 540.
37. Id. at 543.
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the punitive damages award violated Pacific Mutual's due process guarantees un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 38
Pacific Mutual appealed the jury's award to the United States Supreme Court
challenging the verdict on the grounds that the jury's unbridled discretion violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 The Court granted certiorari to review both the
procedures utilized in Alabama for imposing punitive damages and the award
which those procedures sanctioned.40
HI. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Origins of Punitive Damages
While punitive damages, in some form, have long been utilized to punish unde-
sired conduct, the history behind the doctrine reflects the sometimes confused and
controversial manner in which it evolved. The Code of Hammurabi was one of the
first legal systems to utilize punitive damages-as early as 2000 B.C.41 Punitive
damages were also found in the Hittite laws in 1400 B.C. and appeared in the
Hindu Code of Manu in 200 B.C.42 Written laws can also be traced back to Su-
merian, Akkadian and Babylonian civilizations. ' "Even the Bible contains several
examples of multiple damage remedies that Mosaic law provided for offenses such
as stealing."" The forerunner to the modern day doctrine of punitive damages was
the remedy of multiple awards. 4 The ancient legal codes typically provided legal
remedies for civil wrongs and provided multiple restitution when a wrong was per-
ceived to have been perpetrated against society." This ancient notion of multiple
restitution encompassed both a compensatory as well as a punitive or exemplary
38. Id. at 544-45 (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Maddox concluded his opin-
ion with an element of hope stating that:
I take heart that ultimately, when the due process issue is properly presented to the United States Supreme
Court, that Court will hold that giving a jury a "standardless discretion" to award punitive damages in a
civil case violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because I believe that the award of punitive damages in this case violates the defendant's due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, I must respectfully dissent as to that portion of the majority's
opinion.
Id.
39. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1037, 1040.
40. Id. at 1037-38.
41. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1117 (1984) [hereinafter Sales & Cole] (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 1119 (citation omitted).
43. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 378.
44. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1119. Exodus 22:1 (King James) ("Ifa man shall steal an ox, or a sheep,
and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.") Id.; Exodus 22:9 (King
James):
For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost
thing, which another shall challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges;
and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour.
Id.
During this time, the notion of multiple recovery was closely akin to the present day concept of punitive damages.
45. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 378.
46. Id.
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element which was intended to deter future conduct deemed to be detrimental to
societal interests. 4
One critical aspect of early legal doctrine was that no clear distinction existed
between criminal and civil law.' Primitive societies did not effectively differenti-
ate between criminal and tort law, but instead categorized the two legal doctrines
under the "Law of Wrongs. 49 A wrong which was perpetrated by an individual
was considered to affect the entire community," and therefore, multiple restitu-
tion was considered to be a punishment to the defendant rather than compensation
to the plaintiff. s The concept of a strictly civil compensatory legal system had not
yet been fully developed or recognized during this period. 2
The relatively advanced notion of a compensatory legal system emerged as so-
cietal units developed more sophisticated economic structures and evolved beyond
the barter and exchange economic system.5 3 "Once primitive societies advanced
beyond the concepts of private property, wealth and capital surplus, they were able
to reach a new stage of legal development: appeasement or expiation of wrongs
through a payment called composition. 54 The fundamental principle underlying
"composition" was the community's desire to deter wrongdoers from engaging in
conduct detrimental to society.5 5 The concept of "composition" appeared as an
early precursor to the modern notion of punitive damages because individuals
were punished by being required to pay a monetary recompense to their victims.
As primitive societies gradually began to accumulate wealth, the deterrent fac-
tor of "composition" decreased and ultimately disappeared. 6 However, the notion
of a payment for a wrong committed against the community continued to be the
accepted doctrine for requiring a defendant to pay damages. Thus, the distinction
between tort and criminal law began to emerge by providing compensation for
47. Id. The word punitive, meaning to punish, and exemplary, meaning to make an example of, are used inter-
changeably by the commentators and have the same meaning.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 377.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 378. This was the accepted rationale despite the fact that the penalty which was exacted from the
defendant was paid to the victim rather than to the society which was considered to have been injured by the de-
fendant's actions. Id. at 377-78. Despite the fact that multiple restitution was paid to the victim, it was recognized
as a punitive fine. Id. at 378.
The payment of the fine to the victim reflects the confusion of crime and tort in the immaturity of law.
Multiple restitution and punitive damages share this confusion. However, multiple restitution proceeds
from a criminal law theory of punishment whereas the supposedly mature doctrine of punitive damages
derives from a tort law theory of compensation.
Id. at 378-79.
52. Id. at 378.
53. Id. at 377.
54. Id. (citation omitted). "The object of composition was deterrence, not compensation." Id.
55. Id. "Composition and damages are not the same thing." Id. at 377 n.9. " 'In damages the idea of compen-
sation for the actual loss suffered is dominant, but in composition the motive is rather the awarding of an amount
which will be sufficiently large to induce the relatives to keep the peace.' " Id. (quoting WILLIAM SEAGLE, THE
HISTORY OF LAW 42 (1946)).
56. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 377.
57. Id.
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those individuals who could be restored to their previous condition with monetary
recompense, while punishing those individuals who could not effectively compen-
sate their victims for the wrong which had been committed. 8 According to one
commentator, "the distinction between Crime and Tort ultimately lies in their re-
spective remedies: torts are compensated, while crimes are punished." 9 By the
time the earliest Roman laws were codified, criminal law and tort law had become
bifurcated, thus leading to uncertainty regarding the practice of awarding damages
which were punitive in nature.6" It is not entirely certain that Roman law specifi-
cally recognized punitive damages but monetary damages which exceeded actual
damages, were utilized,61 thus leaving the implication that some form of exem-
plary damages was recognized as a matter of fact, if not as a matter of law.62
A variety ofjustifications have been proffered throughout history regarding the
imposition of punitive damages against a defendant. 3 "One theory postulates that
courts used the concept of punitive damages to justify otherwise excessive jury
verdicts."64 Other rationales put forth include the notion that punitive damages
compensated the "plaintiffs ethereal injuries such as hurt feelings, humiliation,
wounded dignity, mental anguish, and embarrassment, which the courts during
the formative stages of the common law were reluctant to recognize as compensa-
ble injuries. "" Finally, punitive damages have been justified as "quasi-criminal
fines [which] satisfy a void allegedly created by the inequitable chasm between se-
vere criminal penalties for wrongs concerning property losses and, in too many
instances, lesser criminal penalties for more severe invasions of personal rights. "66
According to the final rationale, civil courts could punish particularly egregious
torts with punitive damages awards.67 Most jurisdictions which currently permit
58. Id.
59. Id. (citations omitted). This distinction exists despite the fact that even compensatory damages contain an
element of deterrence. Compensatory damages restore victims to their original condition to the extent that mone-
tary recompense can achieve this goal. The defendant, however, who is required to pay the plaintiff compensa-
tory damages is theoretically deterred from engaging in such conduct in the future.
60. Id. at 379.
61. Id.
62. Id. "It may have been that Roman lawyers had as much difficulty separating the concepts of punishment
and compensation, which had only recently been separated, as we have in keeping them distinct today." Id.
63. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1120.
64. Id. at 1120 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1121 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 1123 (citations omitted).
67. Id.
1992]
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punitive damages do so based upon the notions of either deterrence or punishment
or both. 8
1. English Case Law
Punitive damages in the English common law can be traced back to a period in
history when judges were reluctant to overturn a jury's verdict which exceeded the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. 89 In Lord Townsend v. Hughes,7" the court
asserted that judges should not invade the province of the jury by interfering with
the jury's verdict.71 The court stated that, " '[iln civil actions the plaintiff is to re-
cover by way of compensation for the damages he hath sustained, and the jury are
the proper judges thereof.' "72 This language indicates that if the jury returned a
verdict that exceeded the actual damage sustained by the plaintiff, the court would
be reluctant to reduce the award. By implication, the English courts were thus per-
mitting exemplary damages to be imposed by allowing the plaintiff to recover
damages in excess of the actual injury sustained.
In 1763, the English courts in Wilkes v. Wood" specifically permitted a puni-
tive damages award to stand, stating that" '[d]amages are designed not only as sat-
isfaction to the injured person, but likewise-as punishment to the guilty. . . .' ""
However, based upon early English case law, it does appear that some judges
would overturn a jury's award of punitive damages. " As early as 1622, the court
in Hawkins v. Sciet76 announced that it could reduce a jury's award in post-jury re-
views, although the court did not do so in that case.77 Also, the court in Ash v.
68. Id. at 1126. In addition to the two rationales typically advanced in support of punitive damages, Professor
Dorsey Ellis has offered seven additional justifications for imposing punitive damages which include the follow-
ing: "(1) punishment of the defendant; (2) specific deterrence of the defendant; (3) general deterrence of the oth-
ers from acting in a similar manner; (4) preservation of the peace; (5) inducement of private law enforcement; (6)
compensation of victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) payment of plaintiffs attorneys' fees." Id.
at 1126 n.49.
However, Professor Ellis recognized that with such a wide range of justifications being offered, the policy of
punitive damages may not rest on sound policy. Professor Ellis therefore reduced his seven rationales "to two
fundamental tenets: wrong-doers deserve punishment beyond that which compensatory damages provide, and
the judicial system needs punitive damages to deter socially harmful, loss creating conduct by defendants." Id.
(citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Lawof Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1982).
69. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 379. "Considering the sheer size of recent punitive damage awards, a good argu-
ment can be made that [punitive damages] more resemble criminal fines rather than civil damages." Id. at 268-69
n. 19. But see, Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1989) (holding that puni-
tive damages emerged from "amercements" which were payments to the Crown as a result of an offense against
the Crown).
70. 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1649).
71. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 379 n.21 (citing Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1649)).
72. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 379 n.21 (quoting Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1649)).
73. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
74. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 380 n.27 (quoting 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763)).
75. Id. at 379 (citing Hawkins v. Sciet, 81 Eng. Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622)).
76. 81 Eng. Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622).
77. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 379 (citing Hawkins v. Sciet, 81 Eng. Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622)).
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Ash7" indicated that jury verdicts were subject to judicial review after the fact. 9
The Ash court stated that " '[t]he jury were very shy of giving a reason of their
verdict, thinking they have an absolute despotik [sic] power, but I did rectify that
mistake ....' "80 Thus, the debate ensued as to whether punitive damages were
appropriate remedial instruments which could be utilized by a civil jury and sanc-
tioned by a court to punish socially undesirable conduct.
Again in 1763, English courts specifically recognized punitive damages in
Huckle v. Money.81 In that instance, the court declined to overturn or reduce the
jury's damage award, which exceeded the actual damages suffered by the plain-
tiff.8 2 The court stated that" 'I think they [the jury] have done right in giving ex-
emplary damages.' "83 By explicitly approving punitive damages, the court
merged the concepts of compensation and punishment, which had previously been
distinct legal doctrines .'
Despite the fact that punitive damages are utilized primarily in civil cases to-
day, the purposes associated with the punitive damages are considered to fulfill
objectives which are more closely associated with criminal law, such as punish-
ment, retribution and deterrence.8" Indeed, in their infancy, punitive damages
were utilized by the state in criminal law matters.*8 Because early criminal law
systems often did not have adequate resources to prosecute certain cases, punitive
damages were "developed to impose a public sanction against such conduct. 87
2. American Case Law
In 1791, the doctrine of punitive damages reached American shores for the
first time. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Coryell v. Colbaugh88 validated the
78. 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701).
79. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 379 n.22 (citing Ash v. Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701)). "Thejury awarded
2000 pounds to a daughter against her mother. The court set aside the verdict and granted a new trial." Id. at 380
n.23.
80. Id. at 379-80 (quoting Ash v. Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701)).
81. Id. at 380 (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763)).
82. Id. at 380 (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763)).
83. Id. at 380 (quoting Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763)).
84. Sensibar, supra note 1, at 380.
85. Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive
Damages, 17 PEa'P. L. REv. 907 (1990); see, e.g.. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67
(1981) ("[plunitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather punish the
tortfeasor . . . and to deter him and others from similar conduct."); Dyna-Med Inc. v. Fair Emp. & Hous.
Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Cal. 1987) ("[p]unitive damages ... are neither equitable nor corrective; puni-
tive damages serve but one purpose-to punish and through punishment, to deter.").
86. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Margarian, Challenging the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: Putting
Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (1990) [hereinafter Schwartz & Margar-
ian].
87. Schwartz & Margarian, supra note 86, at 485 (citation omitted).
88. 1 N.J.L 77 (1791).
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first punitive damages award and sparked a heated debate which continues today.89
American courts differed sharply over the legitimacy of allowing damages to be
imposed which exceeded the plaintiffs actual injury. The Vermont Supreme Court
upheld a jury's award of punitive damages in Earl v. Tupper,9" stating that "such
damages are given to stamp the condemnation of the jury upon the acts of the de-
fendant on account of the malicious or oppressive character of the acts ... ."'
However, in one of the most scathing attacks ever documented on the propriety
of imposing punitive damages, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Fay v.
Parker92 vehemently rejected the doctrine of punitive damages. The court stated
that "the idea that punitive damages 'is wrong,. . . is a monstrous heresy and' is an
unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the
law."" The New Hampshire Supreme Court propounded that it was critical to
maintain the dichotomous relationship between punishment, i.e., criminal law,
and compensation, i.e., tort law. The court in Fay v. Parker feared that harm
would result to both generally established legal principles and to a defendant's right
to due process if punishment and compensation were merged. 94
Despite the sometimes harsh criticisms from courts in the United States, puni-
tive damages have remained a part of the judicial system's remedial arsenal which
may be imposed against civil defendants who have acted in a manner in which so-
ciety deems inconsistent with its fundamental view of proper societal behavior.
This weapon remains, despite the fact that many of the justifications which have
previously been put forth no longer exist.95 As a result of the debate over the valid-
ity of punitive damages, numerous cases have been presented to the United States
Supreme Court challenging both the validity of imposing punitive damages and
the manner in which they are imposed. While the issue of validity appears to have
been settled, the manner in which punitive damages are imposed still presents the
Court with difficult and complex questions. These challenges have provided the
Court with ample opportunity to define what the Constitution requires when puni-
tive damages are imposed. However, as the decision in Pacific Mutual indicates,
the Court has been largely unsuccessful in defining the parameters of the Four-
teenth Amendment in relation to punitive damages awards.
89. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1124 (citing Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J. L 77(1791)). The court charged
the jury that" 'they were not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or loss' but, . . should
'give damages for example's sake, to prevent such offenses in the future.' "Id. (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted). This jury instruction clearly indicates that the court was permitting the jury to award damages based upon
what it considered to be appropriate in light of the injury which had been caused by the defendant. The charge to
the jury also indicates that the jury was given wide latitude in determining the amount of exemplary damages to
be awarded due to the fact that the judge instructed that the jury did not have to calculate the amount of the award
based upon any actual loss suffered by the plaintiff.
90.45 Vt. 275 (1873).
91.Id. at 288.
92.53 N.H. 342 (1873).
93. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1123 (quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (emphasis added)).
94. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. at 381-82. The decision in Fay v. Parker indicates that even at this early stage in
American history, courts were concerned with the problem of punitive damages and a defendant's due process
rights in a civil proceeding.
95. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1122-23.
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B. Constitutional Challenges to Punitive Damages
As the frequency of punitive damages awards has increased, so has the number
of constitutional challenges to the doctrine of awarding such damages. Numerous
cases have challenged punitive damages awards upon the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause,96 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.9 7 These constitutional challenges represent the modern historical under-
pinnings with regard to the legal arguments which were formulated throughout the
1980's. These challenges led to the culmination of the due process challenge in Pa-
cific Mutual.
In 1986, the Court in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie98 recognized that the
arguments which Aetna introduced regarding the imposition of punitive damages
"raise[d] important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved
.... I'l This dicta by the Court was perceived to be an invitation to future liti-
gants to properly develop their arguments in the lower courts and preserve their
constitutional challenges to punitive damages. However, it was unnecessary for
the Aetna Court to reach the constitutional issues regarding whether the punitive
damage award imposed against the defendant violated the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause or whether the alleged lack of standards in Alabama gov-
erning punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.100 Despite the Court's failure to address the substantive constitu-
tional issues raised in Aetna, the case was nonetheless critical in the evolutionary
process of punitive damages in relation to later constitutional challenges. Aetna
represented the first in a series of cases prior to the Court's decision in Pacific Mu-
tual in which the Court began to indicate that the Constitution may impose some
limits upon the imposition of punitive damages. '01
The next constitutional challenge to punitive damages came in 1986 when the
Court decided Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.0 2 In Bankers Life, a Mis-
sissippi case, some members of the Court began to question the constitutional pa-
rameters of punitive damages awards."0 3 The action arose out of a "bad faith"
insurance claim.104
96. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
97. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia, as follows: "No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. "U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
99. Id. at 828-29.
100. Id. The Court held that "our disposition of the recusal-for-bias issue makes it unnecessary to reach [the
constitutional issues]." Id. at 829.
101. Id. at 828.
102. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
103. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 73.
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The plaintiff sued Bankers Life, and the jury awarded $20,000 in actual dam-
ages and $1,600,000 in punitive damages. 10 The Mississippi Supreme Court af-
firmed the jury's verdict and did not disturb the punitive damage award. 10
The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that "the punitive damages award
was not excessive in light of appellant's financial worth and the degree of its
wrongdoing."10 7 However, Bankers Life's appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court
did not include a federal constitutional challenge to the amount of the punitive
damage award.108
On petition for rehearing, Bankers Life asserted that" '[tihe punitive damage
verdict was clearly excessive, not reasonably related to any legitimate purpose,
constitutes excessive fine, and violates constitutional principles.' "10 The petition
for rehearing further contained the assertion that "the punitive damages award vi-
olated 'due process, equal protection, and other constitutional standards.', "110 The
Mississippi Supreme Court denied Bankers Life's motion for rehearing. I I
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appellant's constitutional ar-
guments because "[t]he vague appeal to constitutional principles does not preserve
appellant's . . . due process claims." 12 The Court noted that a party could "not
preserve a constitutional challenge by generally invoking the Constitution in state
court and awaiting review in this Court to specify the constitutional provision it is
relying upon."" 3 The Court ruled that the appellant's general claim that the award
was excessive and a violation of the Eighth Amendment was too vague at the state
court level to permit the U.S. Supreme Court to properly adjudicate the Four-
teenth Amendment issue upon the merits. 114 The Court similarly determined that
105. Id. at 75.
106. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985).
107. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 75 (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 279
(Miss. 1985)).
108. Id. "Appellant did offer an appeal on a federal due process challenge based upon the alleged 'chilling effect'
of unrestricted punitive damages awards on the exercise of a litigant's right to access to the courts." Id. at 75 n. I
(citing App. to Juris. Statement 135a). However, the Court noted that "[wle read this attack on the alleged open-
endedness of Mississippi's punitive damages award to be distinct from the attack on the size of the particular
award that appellant has waged before this Court." Id. at 75 n. 1.
109. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 139a).
110. Id. at 76 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 15la).
111. Id. at 76.
112. Id. at77.
113. Id. (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407 n.9 (1988) " 'A generic reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment is not sufficient to preserve a constitutional claim based on an unidentified provision of the Bill of
Rights. . . .' "Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 77 (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 407 n.9. Justice Marshall further artic-
ulated that:
Our review of appellant's claim now would short-circuit a number of less intrusive, and possibly more
appropriate, resolutions: the Mississippi State Legislature might choose to enact legislation addressing
punitive damages awards for bad faith refusal to pay insurance claims; failing that, the Mississippi state
courts may choose to resolve the issue by relying on the State Constitution or on some other adequate and
independent nonfederal ground; and failing that, the Mississippi Supreme Court will have its opportunity
to decide the question of federal law in the first instance, while any ultimate review of the question that we
might undertake will gain the benefit of a well developed record and a reasoned opinion on the merits.
Id. at 79-80 (citation omitted).
114. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 77.
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the reference to the Constitution's Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment was inadequate in light of the fact that Mississippi's Constitution has its own
Excessive Fines Clause.11 Despite the Court's refusal to adjudicate the merits of
the case, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that the question of
"whether the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. . . limit[ed] punitive
damages in state civil cases [was] a question of some moment and difficulty
... ,"116 However, responding to this difficulty, Marshall articulated that "where
difficult issues of great public importance are involved, there are strong reasons to
adhere scrupulously to the customary limitation on our discretion."
17
Despite the Court's refusal to adjudicate the due process and excessive fine ar-
guments, Bankers Life, like Aetna, still carried a great deal of significance for fu-
ture litigation based upon statements made by individual members of the Court.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment of the
Court. 1 Both Justices agreed that the defendant had failed to adequately raise and
preserve its constitutional challenges for appeal."' However, Justice O'Connor
utilized Bankers Life to articulate her concerns over the manner in which civil
juries imposed punitive damages upon defendants.' 20 Justice O'Connor wrote:
Appellant has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of the Court's
attention in an appropriate case. Mississippi law gives juries discretion to award any
amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a defendant acts with a certain
mental state. In my view, because of the punitive character of such awards, there is
reason to think that this may violate the Due Process Clause. 
121
Justice O'Connor further postulated that "this grant of. . . standardless discre-
tion to determine the severity of punishment appears to be inconsistent with due
process."122 Justice O'Connor also raised the concern that "[p]unitive damages are
not measured against the actual injury, so there is no objective standard that limits
their amount." 23 As a result, " 'the impact of these windfall recoveries is unpre-
dictable and potentially substantial.' ",124 Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court
had previously recognized that vague sentencing guidelines in criminal cases may
violate the Due Process Clause if the provisions are not clear with regard to the
violation of the criminal statute. 125 In concluding, Justice O'Connor stated that
"[n]othing in Mississippi law warned appellant that by committing a tort that
115. Id. at 78 (citing Miss. CONST. art. 111, § 28). The Court concluded by stating that, "even if the Mississippi
Supreme Court understood appellant to be offering a constitutional challenge, it may very well have taken that
challenge to be anchored in the State Constitution." Id.
116. Id. at79.
117. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 224 (1983)).
118. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at88.
120. Id. at 87-88.
121. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 88.
123. Id. at 87.
124. Id. (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979)).
125. Id. at 88 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
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caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could expect to incur a $1.6 million punitive
damages award." '126
Although silent on the due process issue raised in Bankers Life, Justice Re-
hnquist expressed his reservations about punitive damages in a critical dissent in
Smith v. Wade,127 decided during the 1982 term. Justice Rehnquist addressed the
purpose and rationale behind awarding damages and concluded that "[a] funda-
mental premise of our legal system is the notion that damages are awarded to com-
pensate the victim-to redress the injuries that [the plaintiff] actually has
suffered."' 28 Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that punitive damages diverge
from this principle by awarding damages beyond the actual injury suffered by the
plaintiff. 129
Justice Rehnquist cited three principle reasons for the divergence between full
compensation and windfall by way of punitive damages. First, punitive damages
are imposed in order to punish the defendant.1 30 Second, punitive damages are in-
tended to deter people from violating other people's rights."' "Third, punitive
damages are justified as a 'bounty' that encourages private lawsuits seeking to as-
sert legal rights." 32 Justice Rehnquist argued that a plaintiff should receive full
compensation for his injuries, but no more.' 33 Punitive damages, according to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, operate as a windfall to the plaintiff and do not comport with the
traditional notions of full compensation. 134 "Even assuming that a punitive 'fine'
should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the
plaintiff- who by hypothesis is fully compensated."
135
Justice Rehnquist, like Justice O'Connor in Bankers Life, drew an analogy be-
tween punitive damages in a civil suit and criminal sentencing guidelines.136 Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that "although punitive damages are 'quasi-criminal,' their
imposition is unaccompanied by the types of safeguards present in the criminal
proceedings. This absence of safeguards is exacerbated by the fact that punitive
damages are frequently based upon the caprice and prejudice of jurors."' 37 The
Supreme Court had previously recognized "that 'punitive damages may be em-
ployed to punish unpopular defendants,' and. . . that. . . 'punitive damages [may
be imposed] in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the
126. Id. at 88.
127. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).








137. Id. (citations omitted).
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actual harm caused.' "138 Finally, Justice Rehnquist observed that there has been a
lack of uniformity in the United States with regard to determining the basis upon
which juries could impose punitive damages." 9
In 1988, the Supreme Court was again faced with a constitutional challenge to
punitive damages in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 140 This case
squarely presented the Court with the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause placed limitations upon the monetary amount of punitive
damages that could be awarded by a jury in a civil action.141
Browning-Ferris Industries (hereinafter "BFI") had been accused of antitrust
violations by Kelco Disposal (hereinafter "Kelco") regarding the waste collection
business in Vermont. 42 Specifically, BFI was accused of predatory pricing, at-
tempting to eliminate Kelco from the waste collection market.1" Kelco brought
suit against BFI for antitrust violations as well as contractual interference in Ver-
mont, a state law tort claim. 1" The trial court instructed the jury that punitive
damages could be awarded "on the state-law claims if it found by clear and con-
vincing evidence that BFI's conduct 'revealed actual malice, outrageous conduct,
or constituted a willful and wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiffs
rights.' "14 The jury was further instructed that it could take into account " 'the
character of the defendants, their financial standing, and the nature of their acts.'
"146 No objections were raised by BFI to the punitive damages instructions which
138. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). Justice Rehnquist also observed
with respect to the imposition of punitive damages:
[T]he alleged deterrence achieved by punitive damages awards is likely [to be] outweighed by the costs -
such as the encouragement of unnecessary litigation and the chilling of desirable conduct-flowing from
the rule, at least when the standards on which the awards are based are ill-defined.
Id. (citing John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 870 (1976)).
139. Id. at 60. Justice Rehnquist cited several instances where the lack of judicial standards complicates the
entire analysis when determining the motives of the jury. Id. The Court previously noted in International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), that" 'punitive damages may be employed to punish unpopular de-
fendants ... .' "Id. at 59. Justice Rehnquist also noted that:
One fundamental distinction is essential to an understanding of the differences among the various stand-
ards for punitive damages. Many jurisdictions have required some sort of wrongful motive, actual inten-
tion to inflict harm or intentional doing of an act known to be unlawful -"express malice," "actual
malice," "bad faith," "wilful wrong" or "ill will."Other states, however, have permitted punitive damages
awards merely upon a showing of very careless or negligent conduct... -"gross negligence," "reckless-
ness" or "extreme carelessness." In sharp contrast to the first set of terms noted above, which connote a
requirement of actual ill will towards the plaintiff, these latter phrases import only a degree of negligence.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 60-62 (citations omitted).
140. 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989).
141. Id. at 259. The Court noted that the petitioners challenged the award on due process grounds as well as
upon the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 259 n. 1.




146. Id. at 261-62.
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were proffered to the jury.147 Upon a jury verdict in favor of Kelco, and the subse-
quent affirmance by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals," the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue of punitive damages, having previously rec-
ognized the importance of the issue in Bankers Life. 149
The text of the Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted.""1 ' As an initial inquiry, the Court concluded that the case law which had
previously interpreted the Eighth Amendment held that the Excessive Fines
Clause did not apply to punitive damages awarded by civil juries.151 The purpose
of the amendment and the history surrounding its interpretation also led the Court
to conclude that the clause was confined to criminal proceedings. 152 In so holding,
the Court stated that:
The Eighth Amendment clearly was adopted with the particular intent of placing
limits on the powers of the new Government. "At the time of its ratification, the
original Constitution was criticized ... for its failure to provide any protection for
persons convicted of crimes. This criticism provided the impetus for the inclusion of
the Eighth Amendment .... "153
147. Id. at 262. The jury found in favor of Kelco and awarded "$51,146 in compensatory damages [for] both
the federal-antitrust and state-tort counts, and awarded $6 million in punitive damages." Id. "[T]he Court noted
that the evidence showed that BFI 'willfully and deliberately' "tried to eliminate Kelco from the waste removal
market in Vermont. Id. (quoting Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Ind., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir.
1988)). In addition, the Court found no indication of bias or prejudice on the part of the jury when imposing the
punitive damage award against BFI. Id. (citing Kelco, 845 F.2d at 410). BFI appealed and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on both liability and damages, thereby permitting the $6 million dollar
punitive damage award to stand. Keco, 845 F2d at 404, 410. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
jected the Eighth Amendment argument, stating that "the damages here were [not] so disproportionate as to be
cruel, unusual, or constitutionally excessive." Id.
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
149. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262.
150. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
151. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-63 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1977)); "Bail,
fines and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by subjecting the three to
parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the
criminal-law function of government." Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664; "Amendment inapplicable to deportation be-
cause deportation is not punishment for a crime." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263 (citing Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)); " 'The eight amendment is addressed to courts of the United States
exercising criminal jurisdiction." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-63 (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568,
573-74 (1883)).
152. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266.
153. Id. (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666). According to the Court:
Petitioners . . . [came] forward with no evidence, or argument, which convince[d] [the court] that the
word "fine" as used in the late 18th century, would have encompassed private civil damages of any kind.
Indeed, the term "damages" was also in use at the time the Eighth Amendment was drafted and ratified,
and had a precise meaning limited to the civil context. Cunningham defined damages as follows: "in the
Common law it is a part of what the jurors are to inquire of, and bring in, when an action passeth for the
plaintiff: . . . [Damages] comprehend a recompence for what the plaintiff or demandant had suffered, by
means of the wrong done to him by the defendant or tenant." The dichotomy between fines and damages
was not clear.
Id. at 265 n.7 (citations omitted) (quoting T. Cunningham, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICnONARY (not pagi-
nated) (2d ed. 1771)). Here, the Court distinguished between the word fine, which is used in the language of the




The Court then noted that the Eighth Amendment was derived from the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights.1"4 Additionally, the English Bill of Rights contained
similar language as that contained in the Eighth Amendment, which, according to
the Court, was adopted to "curb the excesses of English judges under the reign of
James H. ""' The Court, after analyzing the impetus behind the adoption of the
Eighth Amendment, as well as the English history, determined that the Eighth
Amendment was intended only to limit fines which were imposed by the federal
government, and payable directly to the same." 6 The amendment was not in-
tended, according to the Court, to limit damage awards which were imposed by a
jury in a dispute between two private litigants." 7
The Court then addressed BFI's claim that the punitive damages fine imposed
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 8 According to the Court, "it is not disputed
that ajury award may not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion, or if it
was reached in proceedings lacking the basic elements of fundamental fair-
ness."" 9 Previously, the Court noted that in cases involving punitive damages,
which were authorized by statute, the Due Process Clause does place some "outer
limits on the size of civil damages award. . .. ""' However, the Court reiterated
that it had not directly considered the issue of whether the Due Process Clause
"acts as a check on. . .jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence
of any express statutory limit."161 However, the Court declined to address the due
process challenge because the issue was not properly before the Court. 162 Instead,
the Court simply concluded that neither the federal common law nor the Eighth
Amendment "provides a basis for disturbing the jury's punitive damages award in
this case."163
As in previous cases,164 individual members of the Court concurred in thejudg-
ment, but again expressed their concern for the potential constitutional violations
with regard to the imposition of punitive damages. 165 Justices Brennan and Mar-
154. Id. at 266 (citing VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 9).
155. Id. at 267 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664).
156. Id. at 268.
157. Id. The Court concluded its opinion by stating that:
In short, nothing in English history suggests that the Excessive Fines Clause of the 1689 Bill of Rights,
the direct ancestor of our Eighth Amendment, was intended to apply to damages awarded in disputes be-
tween private parties. Instead, the history of the Eighth Amendment convinces us that the Excessive
Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.
Id.
158. Id. at 276.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).
161. Id. at 277 (citing Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87).
162. Id. According to the Court, since the "petitioners failed to raise their due process argument before either
the District Court or the Court of Appeals, and made no specific mention. . . in their petition for certiorari in
this Court, we shall not consider its effect on this award." Id. (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 280.
164. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
165. Id.
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shall concurred, but wrote separately. 66 Justices O'Connor and Stevens concurred
in part and dissented in part. 167 Each Justice underscored the potential due process
issues which should be addressed in the appropriate setting. Justice Brennan stated
that the Court in previous cases had determined that where a statute had set forth
the range of damages which could be awarded by the jury, the Due Process Clause
limited those awards which were" 'grossly excessive,' or 'so severe and oppressive
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.' "68
Justice Brennan argued that if the Court could subject a statutory scheme to close
scrutiny, then the Court should be more vigilant where there is no guidance from
the legislature, but merely the discretion of the jury. 69 According to Justice Bren-
nan:
Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the determination of how
large an award of punitive damages is appropriate in a given case, juries are left
largely to themselves in making this important, and potentially devastating decision.
Indeed, the jury in this case was sent to the jury room with nothing more than the
following terse instruction: "In determining the amount of punitive damages,...
you may take into account the character of the defendants, their financial standing,
and the nature of their acts." Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at
all. I do not suggest that the instruction itself was in error. . . .The point is. . .that
the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are imposed by
juries guided by little more than an admonition to do what they think is best. . . . I
for one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages based on such
skeletal guidance than I would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which
responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed.
1 7
1
Justice O'Connor reiterated her views previously stated in Bankers Life, assert-
ing that excessive punitive damages awards may violate due process guarantees. 
1 71
Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he threat of such enormous awards has a detri-
mental effect on the research and development of new products. Some manufac-
turers of prescription drugs . . . have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain
liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market."' 72 However, Jus-
tice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court due to the fact that the due
process issue was not properly before the Court. 73
166. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
167. Id. 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. 492 U.S. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251
U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
169. Id. at 281.
170. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. Id. (citing Brief for Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n as Amici Curiae 5-23). "Similarly, designers of airplanes
and motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of
punitive damages." Id.




Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court and articulated the issue as
being whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
limitations upon the amount of punitive damages which may be awarded to a
plaintiff in a civil action.174 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the due process
issue which, prior to Pacific Mutual, had never properly been presented to the
Court. ' While upholding the particular punitive damages award by a seven to one
margin, the Court did not conclude that punitive damages may never violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 176 The Court determined that while the particular puni-
tive damages award did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did
warn that this award "may be close to the line ... "177 This clearly left the infer-
ence that the Due Process Clause does draw a line at some point.
Justice Blackmun began the opinion by noting that individual members of the
Court questioned the constitutionality of some punitive damages awards in prior
cases. 178 Therefore, according to Justice Blackmun, the issue of punitive damages
and the Due Process Clause was one with which the Court was quite familiar.179
Before addressing the due process issue, the Court had to resolve the initial
question of whether Lemmie Ruffin, as the agent of Pacific Mutual, was acting
within the scope of his employment when he defrauded the plaintiffs, and whether
Pacific Mutual could be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. 180 Pacific
Mutual asserted that when damages were imposed by the jury, "the focus for deter-
mining the amount of those damages shifted from Ruffin, where it belonged, to
Pacific Mutual, and obviously and unfairly contributed to the amount of the puni-
tive damages and their disproportionality."'181 The Court noted that under Ala-
bama common law a corporation could be held liable for the fraud of its employees
who were acting within the scope of their business.182
The Court stated that holding a corporation liable for the frauds of its employees
"creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard substan-
tially against the evil to be prevented.' "18 The Court's rationale in permitting
174. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1037-38 (1991).
175. Id. at 1038-40.
176. Id. at 1046 (Souter, J., took no part in the decision of the Court).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1038. See also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) ("The impact of such a
windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and, at times, substantial. . . ."); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S 42, 50-51 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("In most
jurisdictions jury discretion. . . is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm
caused."); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-84 (1971); St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Wil-
liams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S 482, 491 (1915); Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 (1913).
179. Id. at 1040.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1041.
183. Id. (quoting Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)).
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damages against the corporation is that "[ilf a[] [corporation] were liable for such
damages only upon proof that it was at fault independently, it would have an incen-
tive to minimize oversight of its agents."184 The Court found that the policy of
holding the corporation liable for the fraud of its employees advanced a legitimate
state interest. 185 Because of the state interest in deterring such conduct, the Court
determined that holding Pacific Mutual liable for the fraud of Lemmie Ruffin did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment."18 The Court thus concluded that Ruffin
was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the insurance
fraud.187 As a result, imposing liability upon Pacific Mutual on a theory of respon-
deat superior did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.188
Turning to the due process issue, the Court first analyzed the history of punitive
damages, finding that they had long been a part of the remedies available under
state tort law.189 This historical analysis led the Court to the conclusion that "the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due
process.180 However, the Court recognized the fact that even though a given prac-
tice has historical underpinnings, this history, alone, cannot insulate the practice
from constitutional scrutiny. ' 1 " '[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact
of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it
from constitutional attack . . "182 Furthermore, the Court conceded that "un-
limited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities."193
The Court next analyzed the jury instructions presented in the trial court194 and
concluded that the jury was not unlimited in its discretion to impose punitive dam-
ages. 5 The Court was convinced that thejury instructions presented at trial "rea-
sonably accommodated Pacific Mutual's interest in rational decisionmaking and
Alabama's interest in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate deter-
rence and retribution.' 98
The Court's rationale for determining that the jury's punitive damages award
did not violate the Due Process Clause turned upon the post-trial procedures uti-






189. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)).
190. Id. at 1043 (citation omitted).
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970)).
193. Id. at 1043 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
194. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
195. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1044.




verdict procedure at issue was first articulated in Hammond v. City of Gadsden. 19
The factors which were to be considered included "[t]he culpability of the defend-
ant's conduct, the desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct, ...
[and] other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties."199 According to
the Court, the "Hammond test ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial
court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages."200 The Court determined
that, by reviewing the jury award after the fact, the Court could check the discre-
tion of the jury and act accordingly if the award is excessive.2"1
The Supreme Court also relied heavily upon a refined Hammond test set out in
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby. 2 2 The criteria established in Green Oil was intended to
ensure that the punitive damage award was reasonably related to the goals of retri-
bution and deterrence and included the following:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that
actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the
defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the
costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.1
0 3
According to the Court, "[t]his appellate review makes certain that the punitive
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to
punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition."2"4 This, the Court stated,
prevented the jury from exceeding its discretion when imposing punitive damages
against the defendant.20 5
The Court asserted that the post-jury review process in Alabama had resulted
in the reduction of punitive damages awards where those awards were determined
to be excessive.20 ' In Pacific Mutual, a post-trial review of the award was con-
ducted and, after the application of the relevant factors, it was determined that the
verdict supported the amount of the punitive damages award.27 The U.S. Su-
preme Court was satisfied that the Alabama Supreme Court applied the Hammond
198. 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).
199. Id. at 1379 (citations omitted).
200. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1044.
201. Id. at 1045.
202. 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
203. Pacific Mutual, II1 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223-24).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Wilson v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70, 74 (Ala. 1989); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wade,
544 So. 2d 906, 917 (Ala. 1989)).
207. Pacific Mutual, I IIS. Ct. at 1046.
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standards, as well as the applicable Green Oil factors .28 The Court recognized the
fact that the punitive damages award against Pacific Mutual exceeded the compen-
satory award by more than four times and exceeded the plaintiffs out-of-pocket
expenses by more than 200 times .2 9 However, based upon the review of the pro-
cedural devices utilized in Alabama to review damage awards, the Court found the
award against Pacific Mutual to be within the acceptable limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment.21°
The majority concluded the opinion with some tempering language, however,
stating that "[w]hile the monetary comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be
close to the line, the award here did not lack objective criteria."21' This language
appears to leave the door open for future attacks upon the validity of a system for
imposing punitive damages. While the Court did not determine that Alabama's
scheme for imposing punitive damages awards violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court stopped short of holding that punitive damages could never vio-
late a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion of the Court but rejected both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions which conceded that the Due Process Clause could be
violated by excessive punitive damage awards.212 According to Justice Scalia:
Since it has been the traditional practice of American courts to leave punitive dam-
ages. . . to the discretion of the jury; and since in my view a process that accords
with such a tradition and does not violate the Bill of Rights necessarily constitutes
"due" process; I would approve the procedure challenged here without further in-
quiry into its "fairness" or "reasonableness. 21 3
Justice Scalia urged restraint on the Court arguing that "it is not for the Mem-
bers of this Court to decide from time to time whether a process approved by the
legal traditions of our people is 'due' process ... "214 Instead, Justice Scalia fa-
vored a historical approach to determine whether punitive damages are constitu-
tional. Justice Scalia concluded that "[s]ince jury-assessed punitive damages are a
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The Court's analysis here ignores the fact that the jury, utilizing standardless guidelines, reached its
conclusion without the aid of any objective criteria, as suggested by the Hammond and Green Oil tests. The Court
appears to be unwilling to acknowledge the argument that the instructions given to the jury did not afford Pacific
Mutual due process during the trial phase. Instead, the Court allows a constitutionally suspect jury award to be
reviewed, and corrected at the appellate level if a determination is made that the jury award is excessive. How-
ever, without knowing what factors influenced the jury, it would appear that the appellate review process is lim-
ited to what the Alabama Supreme Court deems to be excessive in light of the factors to be applied under the
Hammond and Green Oil tests.
211. Id. This statement leaves room for the argument that any award in excess of this ratio would be unconsti-
tutionally excessive. However, due to the fact that the Court did not indicate what objective criteria would be
necessary to prevent an award from being constitutionally infirm, a distinction must still be made between the
award itself and the process by which that award was determined.
212. Pacific Mutual, 111 S .Ct. at 1046-48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 1047.
214. Id. at 1048.
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part of our living tradition that dates back prior to 1868, I would end the suspense
and categorically affirm their validity."
215
Justice O'Connor dissented from the opinion of the Court and reviewed many
of her prior concerns about unrestrained jury discretion and the imposition of pu-
nitive damages.216
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of punitive damages awarded by
civil juries on several occasions ,217 but prior to Pacific Mutual had never specifi-
cally adjudicated the parameters of the Due Process Clause and punitive damages.
Individual members of the Court have commented on the veracity of allowing the
jury wide latitude when imposing punitive damages, fearing potential violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, these comments were enunciated pri-
marily in dicta and had no force of law. The members of the Court appeared to be
demonstrating their unwillingness to grant juries an unrestrained hand when
awarding punitive damages. The Court simply waited for the appropriate opportu-
nity to determine whether the Due Process Clause limits the amount of punitive
damages which a civil jury may impose upon a civil defendant.
Despite the misgivings of several Justices concerning the manner in which pu-
nitive damages had been imposed, the Court in Pacific Mutual failed to decisively
answer the lingering question of when punitive damages awards violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. While the Court did indicate that this case comes "close to the
"1218 niailine, it gave no indication of where that line was, or even by what criteria that
line should be drawn. While a "bright line" test in this subjective area may be diffi-
cult to formulate, that alone should not deter the Court from articulating what the
Constitution requires when juries impose potentially devastating awards. Some
objective criteria should be utilized by the jury to place a defendant in a civil case
on notice that certain types of conduct will produce a given set of consequences.
The Pacific Mutual decision has the effect of providing a qualified endorsement
for punitive damages, while leaving even general parameters of permissible puni-
tive damages awards undefined. Essentially, state courts will continue to be called
upon to reduce awards which are deemed to be excessive. Presumably, each state
will continue to apply its own standards which will continue to breed uncertainty
for civil defendants. The Pacific Mutual decision allows the inference to be drawn
that since the Court permitted the award, which was four times the compensatory
damages and 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses, to stand, any award below
those figures would be similarly upheld. The Court left the door open for chal-
lenges to future awards based upon the amount of the award, but it gave no indica-
215. Id. at 1054.
216. Pacific Mutual, 11I S. Ct. at 1056-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 258 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
217. See supra note 164.
218. Pacific Mutual, I lIS. Ct. at 1046.
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tion as to what standards would apply to determine the disproportionality of an
award.
The Court did not specify what procedural safeguards would prevent a state's
punitive damages scheme from being constitutionally infirm. Thus, it is uncertain
whether an inference can be drawn that Alabama's post-jury review is the mini-
mum which states must utilize when considering excessive damage awards. If a
state lacks the procedural mechanisms such as those present in Alabama, will the
Court again have to address the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and punitive
damages?
Instead, the Court endeavored to narrow the reach of its holding by relying
heavily upon Alabama's post-jury review which was conducted by the lower court
in order to ascertain whether the award was excessive. Because the Court opted
for this limited review of the due process issue and did not decisively address the
broader due process implications raised, it appears that the unpredictable state of
affairs will continue to plague civil defendants when facing potential punitive dam-
ages awards.
A. Void-for- Vagueness
The initial analysis must consider the Court's reliance upon Alabama's post-
jury review. The Court ultimately determined that Alabama's post-jury review
mechanism provided the requisite protection which the Fourteenth Amendment
requires. The Court therefore concluded that Pacific Mutual Life Insurance was
accorded the "full panoply of Alabama's procedural protections.'219 The Court de-
termined that this type of review ensures that the award is reasonable in light of the
purpose of the award and rational to deter such future conduct. 2 0 However, when
the Court announced that the appellate review ensured the award was rational in
light of the harm, it presupposed that the appellate court was fully cognizant of the
factors which guided the jury in reaching their decision. In point of fact, there was
a lack of objective standards to guide the jury in their deliberation. "Post hoc re-
view tests only the amount of the award, not the procedures by which that amount
was determined."221
The Court failed to address the distinction between the damages award and the
process by which that award was derived. As Justice O'Connor noted, "[a]ny
award of punitive damages rendered under these procedures, no matter how small
the amount, is constitutionally infirm." 222 Thus, the issue must not be the actual
amount awarded, but how the jury determined the amount of the award.
The jury was instructed 223 that it could impose punitive damages, but that it was
not required to do so. This was completely discretionary and within the jury's
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
222. Id. (emphasis deleted).
223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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province to impose if it deemed appropriate. However, the jury was not provided
any guidance to determine if punitive damages were warranted. The trial judge
did instruct the jury of the purpose of imposing punitive damages224 and that it
could consider the defendant's financial wealth, but no other objective was of-
fered. There is no suggestion that the trial judge improperly instructed thejury, for
under Alabama law, the judge's instructions were appropriate. However, as Justice
Brennan noted in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal Inc.,225 "the instruc-
tion reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are imposed by juries
guided by little more than an admonition to do what they think is best."2 The type
of jury instruction identified in the instant case has the ultimate effect of "identi-
flying] the ultimate destination, but. . . not tell[ing] the jury how to get there.
Due process may not require a detailed roadmap, but it certainly requires direc-
tions of some sort."227 Instructing the jury on the purpose of punitive damages
falls short of providing guidance as to what criteria should be utilized to achieve
those stated objectives.
An analysis of the case law in Alabama indicates that juries, in factually similar
cases, imposed highly disparate verdicts utilizing the Alabama jury instruc-
tions.228 Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, noted that Alabama Su-
preme Court Justice Houston had illustrated the impractical effects of vague jury
instructions. 221 In Washington National Insurance Co. v. Strickland,20 an insurance
agent misrepresented to a potential client that medical coverage would commence
upon payment of the initial premium.23' In fact, the coverage was contingent upon
a medical examination, and the agent should have been aware of this fact.232 It was
unlikely that the prospective insured would indeed pass a medical exam. 233 The
plaintiff sued the insurance company, and the jury returned a verdict of $21,000,
which was roughly twenty-one and a half times the compensatory award. 2
Land & Associates, Inc. v. Simmons235 involved similar facts as Strickland. In
Simmons, the jury returned a punitive damages award of $2,490,000 which was
224. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
225. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
226. Id. at 281.
227. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1059 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228. See infra notes 230, 235.
229. Pacific Mutual, 11 S. Ct. at 1060 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Charter Hosp. of Mobile v. Wein-
berg, 558 So. 2d 909,916 (Ala. 1990) (Houston, J., concurring specially)). Justice Houston stated that:
I do not now believe that our post-trial review of ajury's award of punitive damages cures the constitu-
tionally defective procedure that we now have for submitting a case to a jury where punitive damages are
an issue, except in wrongful death cases. The parties are entitled to procedural due process by a properly
instructed jury, when a jury demand is made by either party.
Weinberg, 558 So. 2d at 916.
230. 491 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1985).
231. Id. at 873.
232. Id. at 876-77.
233. Id. at 877.
234. Id. at 874.
235. 562 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 1989).
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more than 249 times the compensatory award.236 This latter punitive damage
award was more than 118 times the award in Strickland. 2 37 The jury in each in-
stance was punishing substantially similar conduct and operating under the same
guidelines, but each jury returned a verdict substantially disparate from the other.
Each jury had its own notion of what constituted a rational award in light of the
conduct to be punished. These cases demonstrate that the instructions which are
proffered to the jury are vague to the point of producing highly disproportionate
results in similar circumstances. As Justice Houston stated:
Setting standards for post-trial review of a jury's verdict ... no matter how ra-
tional or intelligible such standards may be and no matter how helpful they may be to
the trial and appellate courts when a punitive damage award is challenged as being
inadequate or excessive, does not comply with [Alabama's] constitutional provi-
sion, since the standard by which the jury is to gauge the amount of punitive dam-
ages, if any, that it is to award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible.
2 38
In light of the vague jury instructions utilized in Alabama, the Court's emphasis
upon the Hammond test in Pacific Mutual is misplaced. These factors attempt to
constitutionalize a process which is devoid of any meaningful standards to guide
the jury. However, even an analysis of the Hammond criteria does not readily indi-
cate how the test "ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial court
... "13' The Hammond factors, standing alone, still provide no more than vague
generalities. These factors permit the lower court to review the jury's verdict in
light of the defendant's culpability, the desire to deter such future conduct and any
effect that the defendant's conduct may have had upon third parties.2 40 The Su-
preme Court noted that the trial court or appeals court has a check upon the jury's
discretion by utilizing the Hammond test.241 However, if the goal is to limit the ju-
ry's discretion, then would it not be desirable to allow the jury to consider the
same factors which the Court deems necessary to make its determination of
whether a jury's award is excessive? The answer to this question surely must be
yes.
In addition to the Hammond test, the Alabama Supreme Court has formulated
seven additional factors which are to serve as an aid in determining whether the
jury imposed an excessive award.2 42 Again, the Alabama Supreme Court con-
siders these factors to be crucial to determine whether the jury's award is accept-
able in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.243 These same factors could
certainly be a valuable aid to the jury in making their determination and would
236. Id. at 151.
237. Id.
238. Charter Hosp. of Mobile v. Weinberg, 558 So. 2d 909, 917 (Ala. 1990) (Houston, J., concurring spe-
cially).
239. Pacific Mutual, 11I S. Ct. at 1044.
240. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986).
241. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
242. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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place little or no burden on either the plaintiff or the state. However, these factors
are only applied after the jury has rendered its decision and are not used prospec-
tively before the damage award is formulated. The jury, instead, is left with the
standardless guidance set forth in their jury instructions. The trial courts in Ala-
bama, and subsequent appellate courts "may - but are not required to- take these
factors into consideration in determining whether a punitive damages award is ex-
cessive.""'
The application of the Green Oil factors after-the-fact does not prevent the fun-
damental process by which the jury reached its decision from being unconstitu-
tionally vague.24 "[J]udicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague
law."24 A distinction should be recognized between the process by which the
award is derived and the actual award itself. "After-the-fact review of the amount
in no way diminishes the fact that the State entrusts its juries with standardless dis-
cretion. . . . Even a wholly irrational process may, on occasion, stumble upon a
fair result."247
The very essence of due process requires a state to provide standards by which
the law is to be guided. 24 "A state law that lacks such standards is void for vague-
ness."249 This doctrine applies with equal force to situations where the law pro-
scribes conduct as well as where the law permits a jury to impose standardless
penalties.25 The disparate outcomes of two factually similar cases demonstrate
that each individual juror is guided by his or her own notion of what constitutes a
fair and just verdict.2"' "Instead of reminding the jury that its decision must rest on
a factual or legal predicate, the instruction suggests that the jury may do whatever
it 'feels' like"252 when it determines whether to impose punitive damages and at
what amount.
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,2"3 the Supreme Court struck down a statute which
allowed the jury discretion in determining whether costs could be assessed against
an acquitted criminal defendant.25 4 The statute was essentially standardless and
provided no guidance to assist the jurors in their determination. 55 The Court in
Giaccio reasoned that the statute at issue provided no standards for the jury to
244. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 223 (Ala. 1989)). If the Green Oil factors are not applied, then the Supreme Court's argument becomes
completely unsupportable due to the fact that the standardless jury instructions would still be in place. There sim-
ply must be more procedural due process accorded at the trial level in order to adequately protect the interest of
the defendant.
245. Id. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Bassett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964)).
247. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
249. Id. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 1057 (O'Connor, I., dissenting) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
251. See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
252. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
254. Id. at 401-02.
255. Id. at 401.
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reach a decision.256 Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated that: "The Act,
without imposing a single condition, limitation or contingency on a jury which has
acquitted a defendant simply says the jurors 'shall determine, by their own verdict,
whether. . . the defendant, shall pay costs'. ... 257
Justice Black further commented that such a standardless statute "does not even
begin to meet this constitutional requirement."25 8 Justice Brennan enunciated in
Browning-Ferris that "if anything, our scrutiny of awards made without the benefit
of a legislature's deliberation and guidance would be less indulgent than our con-
sideration of those that fall within statutory limits. "259 The fact that Giaccio in-
volved a criminal penalty does not prohibit an inquiry into the vagueness of a jury
instruction. "The vagueness doctrine is not limited to criminal penalties. 260 The
Giaccio Court specifically rejected the distinction between civil damages and
criminal penalties under the Fourteenth Amendment which stated that: " '[b]oth
liberty and property are specifically protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against any state deprivation which does not meet the standards of due process,
and this protection is not to be avoided by the simple label a state chooses to fasten
upon its conduct or its statute.' "261
As history indicates, punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer
and to deter future conduct by both the defendant and other members of society.2 62
They are in addition to compensatory damages which are intended to restore the
victim to the position occupied prior to sustaining the injury. Punitive damages
carry an element of retribution with them and are perceived as a justifiable means
to prevent socially harmful conduct in the future. Punitive damages are utilized as
" 'private fines levied by civil juries.' "263 However, the dichotomy between state
criminal sanctions and private civil suits becomes less distinct when juries impose
"quasi-criminal" punitive damages, and the courts sanction the award with post-
trial reviews. In light of the fact that a defendant may be civilly punished through
the imposition of punitive damages, it seems rational that all procedural due proc-
ess guarantees should be accorded to the defendant. The Due Process Clause pro-
tects both the individual's liberty in criminal cases, as well as a defendant's
property interest in civil cases. As such, the procedures utilized in both instances
should adequately ensure that due process has been protected.
256. Id. at 402.
257. Id. at 403.
258. Id.
259. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
260. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1058 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladin's Castle,
Inc., 445 U.S. 283 (1982)).
261. Id. (O'Connor, I., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402
(1966)).
262. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1126.
263. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1059 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
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B. Procedural Due Process
Justice O'Connor persuasively argued that the procedure utilized by Alabama
and sanctioned by the Supreme Court did not provide Pacific Mutual adequate
constitutional safeguards.26 4 Applying the three-part due process analysis enunci-
ated in Mathews v. Eldridge,2"' Justice O'Connor argued that procedural due proc-
ess had not been accorded to Pacific Mutual.2 66 The Court had previously
recognized that due process" 'is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.' "267 The Mathews case sets forth a "sliding
scale" in order to determine whether a given set of procedures is adequate to com-
port with due process. 268 The Mathews test consists of the following factors: "(1)
the private interest at stake; (2) the risk that existing procedures will wrongly im-
pair this private interest, and the likelihood that additional procedural safeguards
can effect a cure; and (3) the governmental interest in avoiding these additional
procedures. '269
Under the first prong of Mathews, it is clear that Pacific Mutual has a substan-
tial property interest at stake which should be protected. Pacific Mutual stood to
lose millions of dollars without being apprised of what criteria the jury relied upon
to impose the penalty. 27 The Court appears to have been particularly vigilant in
cases where the rights of the criminal defendant were at issue. However, if the pur-
pose of punitive damages is to punish and to deter, and not to compensate, then
similar procedural safeguards should be considered vital to the protection of the
defendant in the civil context. The Court noted in Giaccio that the Due Process
Clause protects both liberty and property.271
The second prong of Mathews focused upon the existing procedures utilized to
access punitive damages.272 However, very few procedures existed in Alabama to
enable the jury to ensure that its decision was not based upon any bias or passion
which it may have had toward the defendant.273 As Justice O'Connor noted, a post-
trial review of the award does not minimize the constitutional violation which oc-
curs when the jury is permitted to impose an award which lacks any objective
standards.2 74 "At best, this mechanism tests whether the award is grossly exces-
sive. This is an important substantive due process concern, but our focus here is
on the requirements of procedural due process. 275
264. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1061.
265. Id. at 1062 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1061 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
268. Id. at 1062.
269. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S at 335).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1058.
272. ld. at 1062.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1063 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The Alabama procedural review cannot rationally determine whether the jury
applied the correct factors in reaching its conclusion because there were essen-
tially no objective factors for the jury to consider when imposing damages. Being
instructed as to the purposes of punitive damages is far short of instructing the jury
concerning how the damages should actually be calculated. Furthermore, several
members of the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that its review did not neces-
sarily indicate the correctness of the verdict stating that" '[t]he current system fur-
nishe[s] virtually no yardstick for measuring the amount of the award over against
the purpose of the award.' "27 In this regard, the seven factors articulated in Green
Oil would be a significant aid to the jury in determining the amount necessary to
achieve the goals associated with imposing punitive damages. The Green Oil fac-
tors would serve the defendant without imposing any significant burden upon the
plaintiff. These factors are already utilized by the State of Alabama when conduct-
ing a post-verdict review of punitive damage awards. No significant burden would
be placed upon the plaintiff by having the jury utilize the same criteria which the
appellate courts in Alabama consider. Like the Hammond test, the appellate courts
in Alabama consider the Green Oil factors critical to their determination of
whether the jury imposed an excessive award. However, the constitutional depri-
vation has already occurred by allowing the jury to impose standardless awards.
At best, the appellate court can merely reduce the jury's award, thus minimizing
the constitutional violation, but it cannot practically provide an adequate remedy
to the defendant whose constitutional rights have been impinged by the lack of ob-
jective standards.
The third prong of Mathews considers the state's interest in avoiding additional
procedural requirements .277 Certainly the state has an interest in providing defend-
ants with the aspects of procedural due process required by the Constitution. In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court previously stated that" 'the States have no
substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs. . . gratuitous awards of money dam-
ages far in excess of actual injury.' "278 While Alabama admittedly has an interest
in deterring harmful conduct, the state should not allow standardless jury instruc-
tions to be the instrumentality for deterring the unwanted behavior. The state
could advance both the plaintiffs and defendant's interests by ensuring that detri-
mental conduct is punished, but at the same time, ensuring that the punishment is
not arbitrary and capricious. Again, the factors utilized by the appellate courts in
Alabama could advance the interests of the defendant without burdening the plain-
tiff or the state.
276. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 222) (quoting Ridout's-Brown Serv., Inc.
v. Holloway, 397 So. 2d 125, 127-28 (Ala. 1981) (Jones, J., concurring specially))).
277. Id. at 1064.
278. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349) (emphasis deleted).
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When Pacific Mutual was decided, six additional cases challenging punitive
damages under the Fourteenth Amendment were pending before the Court.27 9 In
light of the holding in Pacific Mutual, each case was vacated and remanded back to
the lower courts for adjudication in accordance with the principles laid down in
Pacific Mutual.280 Three of these cases have been reconsidered in the lower
courts, and each case upheld the original punitive damage award citing Pacific
Mutual as its authority.281 This raises the serious question of whether the Pacific
Mutual decision provided any meaningful restraint upon juries in future punitive
damage cases. Lower courts will still be in a position of trying to ascertain
whether a state's statutory or common law schemes for implementing punitive
damages comports with the criteria provided in Pacific Mutual. This determina-
tion may be difficult for lower courts in light of the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to address the broader constitutional issues involved and to rule strictly upon the
procedures applied in Alabama. What is clear is that punitive damages awards are
increasing in frequency. "Within nine months of our decision in Browning-Ferris,
there were no fewer than six punitive damages awards of more than $20 mil-
lion.'282
C. Allocation of Punitive Damages
Both legally and morally sound arguments exist for imposing punitive damages
when an individual or corporation intentionally, willfully and maliciously violates
the public trust. "Properly applied, [punitive damages] can ferret out and sanction
socially undesirable conduct that prosecutors may miss."283 However, the key to
the analysis is defining "properly applied." Punitive damages, as history suggests,
have punished undesirable conduct for more than 200 years, but some extremely
troubling issues persist. One in particular is the issue of the plaintiff receiving the
entire amount of the punitive damage award, which essentially operates as a
"windfall" to the plaintiff. In theory, the plaintiff, through the award of compensa-
279. See Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindlom, 111 S. Ct. 1575 (1991) ($1 million dollar punitive damage
award); Pcific Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991) ($2 million dollar punitive damage
award); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct 1299 (1991) ($2.5 million dollar
punitive damage award); Church of Scientology v. Wollershiem, 111 S. Ct. 1298 ($2 million dollar punitive
damage award); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) (holding that the $500,000 punitive
damage award against the insurer did not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution); Hos-
pital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991) (holding that the punitive damages award against the hospital of
$1.3 million was appropriate when burn patient was slightly injured in helicopter crash); Southern Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 1991) (holding
(1) trial court's oral charge sufficiently constrained jury's determination regarding nature and purpose of
punitive damages; (2) posttrial hearing satisfied requirement that trial court conduct meaningful and ade-
quate review of jury's award; (3) punitive damage award of $490,000 bore reasonable relation to repre-
hensibility of conduct and importance of encouraging other insurers to avoid similar conduct; and (4) fact
that punitive damages award was 4.99 times greater than insured's compensatory damages did not render
punitive damage award excessive.)
Id.
280. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
282. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1066 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. Schwartz & Margarian, supra note 86, at 485.
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tory damages, has been fully compensated for the injuries sustained at the hands
of the defendant. In addition, many of the proposed justifications for the utiliza-
tion of punitive damages no longer exist.2" The argument that punitive damages
compensated the plaintiffs ethereal damages no longer seems viable due to the
fact that "[t]he ambit of compensatory damages has expanded rapidly over recent
years to include an entire spectrum of actual and ethereal injuries, including men-
tal anguish, physical pain, loss of society, loss of consortium, emotional trauma,
and other metaphysical injuries.""' "By purpose and definition, the civil law his-
torically has evolved to compensate and not to punish, and in today's tort repara-
tions system, compensation damages more than adequately fulfills this mission of
total and complete reparations."28 The instructions proffered to the jury in Pacific
Mutual specifically stated that punitive damages are not intended to compensate
the plaintiff but are intended to punish the defendant and deter others from similar
behavior.287
Justice Rehnquist questioned in Smith v. Wade288 whether the individual plain-
tiff should even receive the punitive damage award, or could the policy of impos-
ing punitive damages be better served if the damages were allocated to a purpose
which represented the goals of punishment and deterrence?289 In light of the fact
that several of the previously offered rationales for imposing punitive damages29
are now addressed through compensatory damages, such arguments appear to be
inherently sound.
As courts struggle with both the legal and policy implications of awarding puni-
tive damages, several state legislatures have stepped in to fill the ever-increasing
void left by the Supreme Court's failure to adequately resolve the issue. Two basic
statutory alternatives have been employed by states to limit the amount of punitive
damages which a plaintiff may recover, thereby implicitly discouraging punitive
damages awards. One alternative is to impose a statutory cap upon the amount
which a plaintiff may recover. The second alternative is to allocate the punitive
damage award between the plaintiff and either the state or a fund created for the
purpose of furthering the philosophy behind the imposition of punitive damages.
284. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1122.
285. Id. (citing KENNETH REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (1980)) "The availability of actual dam-
ages in tort for mental anguish, wounded feelings, indignity and embarrassment have made the awarding of ex-
emplary damages on such bases redundant." Id. at 1122 n.27 (quoting REDDEN at § 7.5 (D)).
286. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1123 (citation omitted).
287. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
288. 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 59.
290. Sales & Cole, supra note 41, at 1121-23.
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Colorado,"' Florida,"' Georgia,"' Illinois,"' Iowa,"' and Utah... have all en-
acted statutes which allocate a portion of the punitive damages award to either the
state general fund, or to a fund which is designed to further the goals of imposing
291. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1987). This section provides for the allocation of punitive
damages in the following manner:
(4) One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state gen-
eral fund. The remaining two-thirds of such damages shall be paid to the injured party. Nothing in this
section (4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or
in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment coming due.
Id.
292. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1992). This section provides for the allocation of punitive dam-
ages in the following manner:
(2) In any civil action, an award of punitive damages shall be payable as follows:
(a) Forty percent of the award shall be payable to the claimant.
(b) If the cause of action was based on personal injury or wrongful death, 60 percent of the award shall be
payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund [(created in section 409.2662)]; otherwise, 60 per-
cent of the award shall be payable to the General Revenue Fund.
Id.
293. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1992). This section provides for the allocation of punitive
damages in the following manner:
(e) (2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this subsection as punitive damages, less a
proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, all as determined by the
trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of the state through the Fiscal Division of the Department of
Administrative Services. Upon issuance of judgment in such a case, the state shall have all rights due a
judgment creditor until such judgment is satisfied and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff of the
original case in securing a recovery after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than as puni-
tive damages. A judgment debtor may remit the state's proportional share of punitive damages to the
clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered. It shall be the duty of the clerk to pay over such
amounts to the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services within 60 days of receipt
from the judgment debtor. This paragraph shall not be construed as making the state a party at interest
and the sole right of the state is to the proceeds as provided in this paragraph.
Id.
294. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). This section provides for allocation of
punitive damages in the following manner:
Punitive damages. The trial court may, in its discretion, with respect to punitive damages, determine
whether ajury award for punitive damages is excessive, and if so, enter a remittitur and a conditional new
trial.
The trial court may also in its discretion, apportion the punitive damage award among the plaintiff, the
plaintiffs attorney and the State of Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services. The amount of the
award paid from the punitive damages to the plaintiffs attorney shall be reasonable and without regard to
any contingent fee contract, except that such amount shall not exceed the amount authorized by the con-
tingent fee contract. In apportioning punitive damages as provided in this Section, the court shall con-
sider, among other factors if it deems relevant, whether any special duty was owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff.
Id.
295. IowA CODE ANN. § 668 A. 1. (West Supp. 1987). This section provides fur the allocation of punitive dam-
ages in the following manner:
[Aifter payment of all applicable costs and fees, an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of the puni-
tive or exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to the claimant, with the remainder of the award
to be ordered paid into a civil reparations trust fund administered by the state court administrator. Funds
placed in the civil reparations trust shall be under the control and supervision of the executive council,
and shall be dispersed only for purposes of indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance pro-
grams.
Id.
296. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992). This section provides for the allocation of punitive damages in the
following manner: "(3) In any judgement where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50 % of the amount of
the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund." Id.
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punitive damages. Georgia's allocation statute297 has been declared unconstitu-
tional under state law,298 but other allocation statutes have recently been held to be
valid under state constitutional law.299 In addition to the statutory schemes,3"' sev-
eral members of the Alabama Supreme Court have advocated the allocation of pu-
nitive damages by a trial court judge in absence of a statute authorizing such
allocation.0 1 Justice Shores who specially concurred in Fuller v. Preferred Risk
Life Insurance Co. stated that:
If the court concludes that the amount is not so excessive as to deprive the defendant
of his property in contravention of § 13, Ala. Constitution 1901, it nevertheless may
also determine that it would be in the best interest of justice to require the plaintiff to
accept less than all of the amount and to require the defendant to devote a part of the
amount to such purposes as the court may determine would best serve the goals for
which punitive damages are allowed in the first place: vindication of the public and
deterrence to the defendant and to others who might commit similar wrongs in the
future. 301
This theory is predicated upon the notion that the defendant's payment to a par-
ticular entity other than the plaintiff could help to "eliminate the conditions that
caused the plaintiffs injury. 303 According to Justice Shores, such an allocation
would serve the purposes for which punitive damages are imposed more than al-
lowing the plaintiff to recover a "windfall."3"4 At the same time, the plaintiff
would still receive some portion of the punitive damages award which would con-
tinue to encourage plaintiffs to seek punitive damages in the proper circumstances.
If the dual goals of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence, then pay-
ment of the punitive damages award to an entity other than to the plaintiff will still
further those goals. The defendant, whether required to compensate the plaintiff
or an entity of the state, will still be required to make monetary restitution as de-
297. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
298. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
[Tihe constitutionality of these statutes has been tested in only one jurisdiction, Georgia. See McBride v.
General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), (holding Georgia's apportionment statute
unconstitutional, as a violation of Georgia's due process and equal protection provisions, as well as the
excessive fines provision of the Georgia and Federal Constitutions.
Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878 n.9 (Ala. 1991). But see Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that Florida's allocation statute did not amount to an unconstitutional taking
of property without due process of law).
299. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
301. Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 887 (Ala. 1991).
302. Id. at 886 (Shores, J., concurring specially).
303. Id. By allowing the state, or the courts to allocate the punitive damage award between the plaintiff and
some other entity, or to actually cap the amount of damages which are recoverable, the true rationale behind the
imposition of punitive damages may be ferreted out. If juries know that their ability to compensate the plaintiff
through punitive damages is restricted in this manner, it may ultimately affect the way in which juries reach their
verdicts. If a jury's nodus operandi is to compensate the plaintiff, then such mechanisms may have the effect of
discouraging jurors from awarding punitive damages. If, however, the true rationale behind punitive damages is
to punish the defendant, and not to compensate the plaintiff, then statutory caps and allocation formulas should




termined by the jury. The deterrent element of punitive damages would similarly
remain intact, since, from the defendant's point of view, it does not matter where
the punitive damages award goes. Allocation statutes.. do not reduce the amount
that the defendant is required to pay, but merely distribute those proceeds to a pur-
pose which the state believes will better serve the goals of imposing punitive dam-
ages. The Illinois allocation statute 6 actually provides the trial court judge the
discretion to apportion the percentage of the punitive damage award which the
plaintiff will receive."'
Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether trial
judges could allocate punitive damages in the absence of a statute and determined
that the trial judge did not have the authority to mandate such an allocation without
statutory authorization. 30 8 The court stated that "[a]bsent a finding that the verdict
was constitutionally infirm, the trial court lacked the authority to reduce [the
plaintiffs half of the] punitive damages award ... to an entity other than the
plaintiff ... 309
In Gordon v. State,31° a Florida appellate court upheld the state's punitive dam-
age allocation statute,3" which requires that sixty percent of any punitive damage
award be payable to the Public Assistance Trust Fund, or to the State's General
Revenue Fund.312 The Florida appellate court noted that the
allowance of punitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public policy
.... [Ilt is clear that the very existence of an inchoate claim for punitive damages is
subject to the plenary authority of the ultimate policy-maker under our system, the
legislature. In the exercise of that discretion, it may place conditions upon such a
recovery or even abolish it altogether.31 3
The court concluded that the allocation statute was not an unconstitutional taking
of property because the "right to have punitive damages assessed is not property;
and it is the general rule that, until a judgment is rendered, there is no vested right
in a claim for punitive damages."" 4 The court also analyzed the legislative history
of the Florida statute and determined that a reason behind the enactment of the
statute was to discourage punitive damages claims .31 ' By allocating a portion of
305. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
308. Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992).
309. Id. at 1025. Despite the unwillingness of a majority of the court to allow a trial judge the discretion to
allocate punitive damages in absence of an enabling statute, Justice Shore's special concurrence should provide
an impetus for the Alabama Supreme Court as well as other courts in the future to consider such an alternative.
310. 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
311. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
312. Id.
313. Gordon, 585 So. 2dat 1035-36 (citing Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d412 (Fla. 1950)).
314. Id. at 1036 (citing Kelly v. Hall, 12 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1941)).
315. Id. at 1037.
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the damages, the plaintiff and his attorney have less of an incentive to seek puni-
tive damages.316
However, under allocation statutes, the incentive is not totally eliminated, due
to the fact that the plaintiff will still receive a percentage of the punitive damages
award. According to the Florida appellate court, the legislature is perfectly within
its province to determine that punitive damages suits should be discouraged as a
matter of public policy.317 This is permissible based upon the fact that the court
previously indicated that there was no constitutional right to receive punitive dam-
ages. 318
As a result of the holding in Pacific Mutual, more states may now be willing to
enact legislation which will have the effect of discouraging punitive damages
claims. Allocation statutes appear to be an appropriate mechanism in light of the
rationales proposed for imposing punitive damages. The plaintiffs should not re-
ceive a windfall as a consequence of punishing a defendant. Once full compensa-
tion has been achieved in the form of compensatory damages, which encompasses
a wide variety of damages, the plaintiff should not enjoy a windfall. Additionally,
a plaintiffs recovery should not hinge upon the "deep pockets" of the defendant.
Allocation statues would provide the plaintiff with some measure of additional
compensation, while still advancing the dual goals of punishment and deterrence.
In addition to allocation statutes, state legislatures have also responded to the
growing punitive damage crisis by enacting statutes which expressly "cap" the
amount of punitive damages which a plaintiff may recover in a particular type of
action. 19 These legislative responses may increase in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Pacific Mutual which provided a qualified endorsement for the common
law imposition of punitive damages.
D. Policy Considerations
Punitive damages should not be utilized as a mechanism to transfer wealth from
one segment of the society to another. Nor should a plaintiffs right to recover pu-
nitive damages rest upon the fortuitous circumstances of being injured by a sol-
vent - as opposed to an insolvent - defendant. It is a rare case indeed, when one
individual sues another individual and seeks punitive damages. Corporations with
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1992):
[Punitive damages not to exceed $250,000; exceptions:]
An award of punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000; unless it is based upon one or more of the fol-
lowing:
(I) A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even though the damage or injury was inflicted
only on the plaintiff; or
(2) Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad faith not a part of a pattern or practice; or
(3) Libel, slander, or defamation.
See also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5 (Michie 1992) (limiting the recovery of punitive damages to $250,000 in
cases not arising out of products liability actions or in cases where the defendant did not act intentionally or will-
fully to cause injury to the plaintiff. Otherwise, there is no limitation upon the amount of punitive damages which
may be awarded to the plaintiff.) Id.
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the ability to pay large punitive damages awards are much more likely to be targets
of a plaintiff seeking a multi-million dollar punitive damages award than is an in-
dividual defendant -though the acts which each may have committed are no less
egregious. Therefore, one cannot overlook the importance which the "deep-
pocket" theory has upon juries when determinations with regard to punitive dam-
ages are being made. Punitive damages should not be imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously or without the full backing of the United States Constitution and the
laws made in pursuance thereof.
While precise calculations are difficult, some broad generalizations can be ar-
ticulated as the frequency and severity of punitive damage awards increase. When
a corporation, such as a pharmaceutical company, is inhibited from producing a
new drug for fear of litigation and multi-million dollar damage awards, it is the
public which ultimately suffers. When insurance companies, such as Pacific Mu-
tual, are required to pay million dollar punitive damage claims, which are vastly
disproportionate to the actual damages which were caused, it is the public who
pays through rising insurance premiums. Corporations should be encouraged to
develop new innovations that will serve the public interest. The state, with the aid
of the courts, must always be vigilant and ensure that the public's safety is pro-
tected from dangerous products, but those same safeguards should also be present
to ensure that this country's entrepreneurial spirit is not stifled.
Inevitably, however, as the cost of litigation becomes a cost of doing business,
that cost must subsequently be transferred to the consumer, or in the case of Pa-
cific Mutual, to the insured. In addition to this short-term economic impact of
higher costs, longer and potentially more devastating economic implications may
arise as companies are forced to pay million dollar damage awards. The cost of
litigation may only be passed on to the consumer to the extent that companies can
do so and remain economically competitive in the marketplace. When the market
is no longer economically viable, companies will either cease production of the
most costly products, or disappear from the market altogether. This is particularly
true for start-up companies, or companies attempting to develop new products.
The companies which remain will then be able to drive prices up due to the re-
duced competition in that particular market. Arguments have been proffered with
regard to the economic assertion that if companies cannot produce safe products
or protect employees in the workplace then they should not be in business. How-
ever, this argument is again predicated upon the belief thatjuries are rational when
imposing punitive damages. Often, it is difficult to determine whether juries are
indeed being rational when the standards by which punitive damages are being im-
posed are uncertain.
If America is going to continue to rely upon punitive damages as a means to en-
sure that companies are behaving responsibly, then it is equally incumbent upon
state legislatures and upon the courts to ensure that juries act with the same re-
sponsibility that we are demanding from business. Such responsibility includes
knowing the criteria by which courts are going to permit juries to levy potentially
devastating economic penalties.
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While the short-term impact of a punitive damage award is to compensate the
plaintiff, the long-term economic implications fall squarely upon the general pub-
lic through higher costs and fewer choices in the marketplace. Wrongdoers should
be punished to the fullest extent of the law, but should also be provided the consti-
tutional safeguards which are the hallmark of democracy and freedom.
The Court in Pacific Mutual asserted that it was deciding the case based upon
the procedural criteria utilized in Alabama. The Court appeared to be unwilling to
gaze beyond the impact of its immediate holding by limiting its inquiry to the dam-
ages suffered by this particular plaintiff in Pacific Mutual. However, the "damage"
may be more wide-spread than the Court is willing to recognize if states are per-
mitting juries to impose damage awards which do not bear a rational relationship
to the injury being caused or to the harm which is to be prevented. The difficulty in
analyzing whetherjuries are being rational becomes evidently clear when trying to
ascertain exactly what criteria the jury is applying when they are handing down
multi-million dollar punitive damage awards. While no two cases present exactly
the same issues, and no two juries share identical characteristics, due process re-
quires that individuals be able to order their affairs in some reasonably predictable
manner; otherwise, procedural due process means precious little. If juries are
simply permitted to impose punitive damages based upon their subjective notion
of right and wrong, without receiving greater guidance from the courts, then de-
fendants in civil cases are not being given the protection which the Due Process
Clause mandates.
E. Post-Pacific Mutual Developments
Since Pacific Mutual was decided, states have sought to determine whether the
standards applied by their juries measured up to the criteria in Alabama which the
Supreme Court determined to be appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.320 the Fourth Circuit vacated a punitive
damage award of $100,000 against a defendant which possessed a net worth of
$6,248 requiring a new trial for the punitive damage portion of the award. Ac-
cording to the Court, the standards utilized by South Carolina were devoid of any
meaningful standards and gave the jury little or no guidance.321 The instruction
which the jury received before deliberation was as follows:
The amount of punitive damages assessed against any defendant may be such sum as
you believe will serve to punish that defendant and deter it and others from like con-
duct.
322
Instead of the vague guidance which the jury received, the Fourth Circuit indi-
cated that under South Carolina law, the jury must be instructed on the following
with regard to punitive damages:
320. 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 100.
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(1) relationship to the harm caused;
(2) any other penalty that may have been imposed may be imposed for the conduct
involved;
(3) improper profits and the plaintiffs costs; and
(4) ability to pay.
323
Similarly, in Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Mosbacher,324 the court remanded
the punitive damage award back to the lower court. The problem in Arkansas stems
from the fact that juries are told that they are to consider the defendant's net worth
and that punitive damages serve to punish and deter a defendant's conduct.325
Other courts have been less demanding with regard to what juries are required
to consider when imposing punitive damages. In Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Insur-
ance3 21 the Fifth Circuit determined that juries in Mississippi were being ade-
quately instructed on the issue of punitive damages and that defendants were being
accorded due process. 327 The Eichenseer court approved the following criteria:
(1) what amount is necessary for the punishment of wrongdoing and deterrence of
similar conduct;
(2) what amount is reasonably necessary to make an example to deter others from
similar conduct;
(3) what is the financial worth of the defendant.328
While Mississippi's instruction at least attempts to convey to the jurors what
they should consider in awarding punitive damages, it still has the effect of allow-
ing each jury to subjectively determine "what amount is reasonably necessary" to
make an example of the defendant. This type of instruction will have the effect of
allowing each jury to impose disparate punitive damage awards in light of their
own notion of right and wrong and provides no real measure of due process to de-
fendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
For several years now, the Supreme Court has seemingly invited litigants to
properly develop their due process claims in the lower courts so a final resolution
on this issue could be reached. It is difficult to understand what influenced the
Court to rule as it did in Pacific Mutual. Justice O'Connor offered one possible ra-
tionale, stating that "[iut may be that the Court is reluctant to afford procedural due
process to Pacific Mutual because it perceives that such a ruling would force us to
evaluate the constitutionality of every State's punitive damages scheme."329 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor also offered a solution stating that "I am confident. . . that
if we announce what the Constitution requires and allow the States sufficient flexi-
323. Id. at 110.
324. 933 F 2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1991).
325. Id. at 1448.
326. 934 F. 2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1991).
327. Id.
328. Eichenseer, 934 F2d at 1385.
329. Pacific Mutual, I I I S. Ct. at 1067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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bility to respond, the constitutional problems will be resolved in time without any
undue burden on the federal courts."33 Indeed, Justice O'Connor noted that the
decision in Pacific Mutual may have the effect of encouraging litigation anyway
because the Court did not articulate what the Constitution requires.331 Instead, the
Court professed that one particular scheme passed constitutional muster in this
particular instance .332 As Justice O'Connor eloquently concluded:
For more than 20 years, this Court has criticized common-law punitive damages
procedures, but has shied away from its duty to step in, hoping that the problem
would go away. It is now clear that the problems are getting worse, and that the time
has come to address them squarely. The Court does not address them today. In my
view. . . it offers an incorrect answer.333
Only time will tell whether the Court's decision in Pacific Mutual will provide a
workable solution in advancing the state's interest of imposing punitive damages
while protecting a civil defendant's right to both substantive and procedural due
process. The post-Pacific Mutual cases indicate that the states are struggling to
conform to the standards of Pacific Mutual. It is encouraging that states, in light of
Pacific Mutual are requiring more specificity when juries are instructed on puni-
tive damages. However, as the Eichenseer decision illustrates, courts are going to
continue to approve vague instructions until the Supreme Court speaks more de-
finitively as to what the Constitution requires. If the Pacific Mutual standards
prove to be unworkable, state legislatures, with the approval of the courts, surely
must and will take a more active role to ensure that juries are not acting in an arbi-
trary or capricious manner when imposing their verdicts. In the meantime, civil
defendants will continue to challenge punitive damages awards as a violation of
their due process guarantees. This will continue to place the Court squarely in the
middle. Once again it will be called upon to fashion a remedy which will protect
the various interests being advanced by the imposition of punitive damages while
also protecting those who are being forced to "pay."
330. Id.
331. Id. Because the Court opted for a case-by-case approach, defendants will continue to challenge the proce-
dures utilized by states when permitting juries to impose punitive damages. The Court appears to be unwilling to
articulate what the Constitution requires in an attempt to avoid raising questions as to the validity of each state's
method for imposing punitive damages. However, as Justice O'Connor indicates, this approach may have the op-
posite effect than that intended by the majority in Pacific Mutual. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While the Court
indicated that Alabama's scheme did not violate the Due Process Clause, it did not attempt to indicate what proce-
dures would be constitutionally insufficient. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
The Court's decision in Pacific Mutual in no way forecloses future challenges from defendants in states which do
not utilize the same procedures as those in Alabama.
332. Id. at 1056.
333. Id. at 1067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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